The Bosnian hiatus: a story of misinterpretations. CEPS Policy Brief No. 219/November 2010 by Tirak, Goran.
 
 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the 
aim of interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a 
timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a 
personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. 
Goran Tirak is an analyst at Bosnian think tank Populari, and a visiting Research Fellow at CEPS. He 
wishes to thank Michael Emerson, Senior CEPS Research Fellow, for helpful discussions and generous 
support of this work. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2010 
No. 219/November 2010 
The Bosnian Hiatus: 
A Story of Misinterpretations 
Goran Tirak 
 
fter seven years of debate, the decision to close 
the office of the High Representative in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (OHR), an international body 
overseeing the peace implementation in Bosnia, has 
not yet been implemented. Bosnia is a potential EU 
candidate, but the majority of member states do not 
consider Bosnia capable of negotiating membership 
with the Union while the OHR remains the supreme 
authority governing the country. However, there was 
never enough political will on the part of any of the 
actors to bring about closure of the OHR. 
This paper presents an overview of the different 
opinions that have been blocking this closure. In 
addition, it argues that Bosnia’s political structures 
have no genuine wish for the OHR to hand over 
ownership of the processes in the country, so they are 
creating crises to prevent the closure of the OHR. 
Finally, the paper examines the EU’s role in these 
processes, and the implications of the inability of the 
EU27 to reach consensus on Bosnia. 
Introduction 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: Bosnia or BiH) 
has often been described as a failed state, but in 
reality it is actually not that far behind other Western 
Balkan countries that have aspirations to join the EU. 
Due to recent developments, however, there is a 
danger that this gap will widen. 
A few weeks ago, the EU Council decided to give the 
green light to the EU Commission to accept Serbia’s 
EU membership application and start the ‘Avis’.
1 
Montenegro and Albania are even more advanced in 
the process and have already received the Avis.
2 
Bosnia, however, cannot even submit its membership 
application. It is the only Western Balkan country 
(except Kosovo)
 3 that has not yet officially applied 
for EU membership. As things stand, this is not likely 
to change any time soon – both the Council and the 
European Commission have explicitly defined the 
OHR closure as a precondition for BiH to apply for 
EU membership.
4 
The OHR is one of the most frequently used 
acronyms when talking about Bosnia: the Office of 
the High Representative. It is the international 
                                                      
1 Once a country applies for EU membership, the Union sends 
back a detailed questionaire to the potential candidate state. 
This questionaire comprises questions about the country’s 
institutions, policies and infrastructure. On the basis of 
thoroughly reviewed answers, the EU Commission issues the 
Avis, or opinion on the application. The opinion of the EU 
Commission indicates when the applicant country might be 
ready to start accession negotiations. 
2 On 9 October 2010, the EU Commission concluded that the 
accession negotiations should be opened with both 
Montenegro and Albania once those countries meet a set of 
custom-tailored key priorities.  
3  Kosovo is, however, a special case since five of the EU 
member states have not recognised its sovereignty. 
4   General Affairs Council of the Council of Europe, 
Conclusions on Enlargement/Stabilisation and Association 
Process, Brussels: Progress Report, 7-8 December 2009. 
A  
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institution responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the civilian aspects  of the 1995 
Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the 1992-
1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current 
High Representative in Bosnia, Austrian diplomat 
Valentin Inzko, stated in a recent interview that the 
decision on the OHR closure will come in “two or 
three years – maybe even sooner.”
5   Why is it 
necessary for BiH to wait that long to even start the 
Avis exercise?
6  
Regardless of the policy that “each country moves 
step by step towards EU membership as it fulfils its 
commitments,”
7   the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) can be seen as a regional course of 
action.
8  The SAP stimulates regionality in order to 
prevent less advanced countries from backsliding, 
while upholding fair conditionality based on 
individual merit.
9   If a country is advanced, like 
Croatia, of course it would not be held back because 
of others. Still, if a country is lagging behind like 
Bosnia is, or is blocked like the FYRM because of the 
name issue with Greece, it is bad for the process. 
Having this in mind, Bosnia`s current predicament is 
detrimental to the overall SAP process, and will have 
a negative impact on the whole region. 
While a large part of the responsibility for the current 
impasse lies with Bosnia’s leaders, the “unwieldy 
structures” and the negative dynamics created by the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, the EU is to be blamed for 
not opening up a walkable path for Bosnia. In short, 
Bosnia cannot apply for EU membership as long as 
there is the OHR, but it is the EU that does not have 
the ability to tackle the issue of closing down the 
OHR with its international partners, because some of 
the EU member states oppose the closure. Let us 
explore how the EU managed to manoeuvre itself into 
such a corner. 
                                                      
5   Nezavisne Novine, “Valentin Inzko: Zatvaranje OHR-a 
zavisi od PIC-a i domaćih političara”, 2 June 2010.  
6  In the most optimistic scenario, when BiH submits the 
application and receives the questionnaire, it will need 4-5 
months to complete it. Then there will be follow up questions, 
after which the Commission could issue an Avis in following 2 
months, and then Bosnia could become a candidate in another 
two months. However, this optimistic timeframe is highly 
unlikely. 
7 “The Stabilisation and Association Process”, European 
Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement). 
8 EU Council official, interviewed by the author, June 2009. 
9   Bertelsmann Foundation, Center for Applied Policy 
Research, Policy Planning Staff, German Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Conference Report, Integrating the Balkans: Regional 
Ownership and European Responsibilities. Balkan Forum, 
Berlin, 15-16 July 2002. 
EU and the peace process in Bosnia 
At the beginning of the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP)
10  discussions had only just started, and this 
new policy lacked the means or experience to address 
the conflicts properly.
11  There was no precedent to 
guide the EU’s involvement, and the leaders only 
possessed a superficial knowledge of the politics and 
history of Yugoslavia.
12 Europe acted as if it was a 
unified force with the new CFSP, when in fact there 
was a great deal of reluctance from individual 
member states about their involvement in the region.
13 
In addition, there was also disagreement between the 
European, US and Russian politicians on how the 
crises should be handled.
14 
The fiasco of the EU’s CFSP during Yugoslavian 
wars
15  saw more than 100,000 deaths and over a 
million refugees from Bosnia alone. It was only after 
the US-led NATO military intervention in 1995 that 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
                                                      
10  The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a 
continuation of former European Political Cooperation, which 
began in 1970 and was formalised in 1986 and required that 
member states only consult one another informally on 
international policy issues. In response to the many 
geopolitical changes in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, 
such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the reunification of 
Germany, the breakup of Yugoslavia, leaders of the 12 
countries that made up the European Union at the time 
recognised the necessity to develop formal instruments for 
foreign policy. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the 
CFSP as one of European Community pillars, and created 
procedures for intergovernmental decision-making on 
international policy issues. The European Council defines the 
principles of CFSP, and based on these guidelines the Council 
of Ministers takes decisions unanimously. 
11  Filippo Andreatta (1997), The Bosnian War and the New 
World Order: Failure and Success of International 
Intervention, Occasional Paper No. 13, WEU Institute for 
Security Studies. 
12 Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup (1999), The War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe.  
13  Filippo Andreatta (1997), The Bosnian War and the New 
World Order: Failure and Success of International 
Intervention, Occasional Paper No. 14, WEU Institute for 
Security Studies. 
14 According to Filippo Andreatta, the US had no troops on the 
ground and as a result, proposed more idealistic strategies for 
settlement. These proposals were resented by the Europeans 
who were trying to foster diplomatic solutions and to protect 
their own deployed troops. Once America and Europe were 
finally able to agree on how to retaliate to the hostilities, 
Russia tried to block them in order to gain more influence in 
the region through its historic Slavic and Orthodox 
connections to the Serbs. 
15 Ana E. Juncos (2005), “The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or 
(re)Inventing the EU”, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 6, 
No. 2, pp. 88-108. The Bosnian Hiatus | 3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: GFAP or the 
Dayton Agreement) was signed. The GFAP was in 
essence a US-managed initiative, both militarily and 
diplomatically. Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement is 
the current Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
During the GFAP negotiations, the European powers 
resented being sidelined by the US in the peace 
process, so they lobbied Washington for UN 
involvement in overseeing the implementation of 
Dayton agreement. The US refused and the Europeans 
responded with the idea of establishing a Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) in order to obtain more 
influence in the implementation of the civilian aspects 
of the peace agreement.
16  
The PIC Steering Board provides political guidance to 
the UN Security Council mandated High 
Representative in Bosnia. PIC is a broad umbrella 
group of 55 countries and agencies that have 
contributed most to the peace effort in BiH. The 
steering board contains 11 members: four EU member 
states (France, Germany, Italy, the UK), two EU 
institutions (the Presidency of the European Union,
17 
the European Commission), and five non-EU 
countries (Canada, Japan, Russia, the US and Turkey, 
which is representing the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference).
18 
In Bosnia, although formally an independent state and 
not an international protectorate, it is the High 
Representative who has the “final authority in 
theatre”.
19  He has the power – colloquially known as 
the Bonn powers – to impose laws and other decisions 
and to dismiss obstructive local officials from office. 
No judicial institutions in Bosnia, not even the 
Constitutional Court,
20  have the jurisdiction even to 
                                                      
16 Ibid. 
17 Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU presidency 
is not present at the PIC SB meetings; the EU is represented 
only by the European Commsion.  
18  “General Information”, Office of the High Representative 
(www.ohr.int). 
19  General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1995) Article V, Annex 10.  
20 In early 2007 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia published 
its ruling declaring the absence of any right of appeal for 
individuals sacked by the High Representative a violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Under the 
Bosnian Constitution, the Convention is the highest law of the 
land. Instead of using the opportunity to soften, or at least 
bring in accordance with human rights standards, the PIC 
Steering Board “noted with concern that domestic actors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have challenged actions undertaken 
on the basis of Dayton and UN Security Council Resolutions.” 
It called upon the High Representative to take appropriate 
action, which he did on 23 March, issuing an “Order” on how 
the ruling is to be implemented: through OHR and nobody else. 
review the actions of the OHR. Each of the High 
Representatives so far has been a European.
21  
The main purpose of the Dayton Agreement was to 
stop the war, and very few actually believed that it 
would present a long-term political framework for 
Bosnia. Based on the Agreement, the Republic of BiH 
continued “its legal existence under international law 
as a state, with its internal structure modified.”
22 
Losing the status of a republic, Bosnia became a de 
facto decentralised federation.
23  Following  the 
conflict frontlines within Bosnia, two entities were 
established within Bosnia: the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
24  and the Republika Srpska (RS). 
Because of its strategic importance,
25 the status of the 
city of Brčko in northeast Bosnia and its surrounding 
territory could not be agreed upon; so, it was decided 
that Brčko would be administrated by an international 
supervisor.
26  
The new constitution, the ‘Annex 4’, replaced the 
concept of citizens with three constituent ethnic 
groups – Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslim), Serbs and 
Croats. It also defined complex mechanisms of ethnic 
and entity vetoes and an electoral system based on 
ethnicity. Regardless of the “seductive appeal of 
ensuring equality of the ethnic groups”, such a system 
ultimately presents a “mild form of racism.”
27 This 
was confirmed by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which in December 2009 obliged Bosnia to 
amend the discriminatory amendments of its 
                                                      
21 The High Representatives thus far: 1. Carl Bildt (Sweden) 
1995-1997; 2. Carlos Westendorp (Spain) 1997-1999; 3. 
Wolfgang Petritsch (Austria) 1999-2002; 4. Paddy Ashdown 
(UK) 2002-2006; 5. Christian Schwarz-Schilling (Germany) 
2006-2007; 6. Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia) 2007-2009; 7. 
Valentin Inzko (Austria) 2009- present. 
22 GFAP, Annex IV (The Constitution), Article I. 
23   European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), “Opinion on the Constitutional 
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the 
High Representative”, Venice, 11 March 2005.  
24 Which is, again, a decentralised federation composed of 10 
cantons. 
25   It basically divides Republika Srpska into two parts 
providing the only land corridor from Western to Eastern part 
of Republika Srpska. 
26 The Brčko District, representing 0.9% of BH territory, was 
put under international arbitration by the High Representative, 
and Brčko District (even though, it has the status of the district 
Brčko is governed by mayor and district assembly) was 
established in 1999. It was the only part of BiH that was not 
under the jurisdiction of either entity governance, and was 
constituted as a direct international protectorate. The 
International Brčko supervisor was always the Principal 
Deputy High Representative, which was each time an 
American. 
27 Sienho Yee (1996), “The New Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 
No. 2.  
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constitution, to align it with the European Charter of 
Human Rights (ECHR).
28  The ruling has not been 
implemented because there are different views among 
the political representatives of the country’s three 
ethnic groups about how the constitution should be 
changed.  
Because of the “complexities facing them”,
29  the 
parties
30 engaged in the GFAP were appointed by the 
High Representative to help accomplish the task of 
implementing the civilian aspects of the GFAP. 
Originally, in 1995, the plan for the internationally 
supervised transition to self-governing democracy in 
Bosnia was to last for only one year, until the 1996 
election of state and entity bodies. After the elections, 
which, instead of the change in the Bosnian political 
landscape that most of PIC members had hoped for 
brought the same political leaders who fought the war 
back into power, the OHR closure deadline was 
prolonged for a further two year ‘consolidation 
period’. After only a year – in December 1997
31 – 
OHR’s mandate was extended indefinitely. It was 
during this PIC meeting that the High Representative 
was given the power henceforth to issue binding 
decisions, impose legislation and to remove officials 
from office.  
Considering the situation in post-Dayton Bosnia, the 
decision to equip the OHR with the Bonn powers 
seems logical, even from today’s perspective. There 
was no freedom of movement, and war criminals 
roamed freely, mainly in Republika Srpska. There 
was open hate speech  in the media. Thousands of 
refugees were expelled from their homes and were 
beaten when they returned.
32 The OHR indeed played 
a major role in helping to normalise the situation. 
                                                      
28 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
enshrines certain political, social, and economic rights for EU 
citizens and residents that are incorporated into EU law. The 
charter states that the Union must act and legislate consistently 
with the Charter or the EU courts will strike down European 
Union legislation which does not comply with it. The Charter 
solely applies to the member states and their implementation 
of European Union law and does not extend competencies of 
the Union beyond the ones given to it in the treaties. The 
document gained full legal effect in 2009, when the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force. 
29 GFAP, Annex X, Article I,2. 
30 The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska. 
31  Peace Implementation Council, “PIC Bonn Conclusions: 
Self-sustaining Structures”, Bosnia and Herzegovina: PIC 
Main Meeting, December 1997. 
32   For example, in 2000, a serious incident occurred in 
Krcevine village in the municipality of Capljina when four 
unknown suspects forcibly entered the Bosniak collective 
accommodation centre and harassed the returnees. In the 
aftermath of the event OHR provided help to protect these 
people. 
Almost 100% of private property has been returned to 
the rightful owners as a result of OHR efforts. Its 
actions contributed greatly to establishing trust 
between the previously warring parties. Undoubtedly, 
the OHR’s presence and the use of Bonn powers “was 
beneficial for BiH and its citizens and a necessity 
following a bloody war.”
33 The OHR either directly 
imposed or initiated the processes that resulted in the 
passing of important legislation, which has helped 
create effective governance on the national level. The 
downside was, however, that the institution also took 
over the domestic government’s job of governing the 
country.  
Time for transition? From Dayton to 
Brussels  
Moving slowly from a post-conflict country towards 
EU candidacy, it became evident that Bosnia must 
move away from direct international oversight. Back 
in 1999, the High Representative at the time, 
Wolfgang Petritsch, introduced the “ownership 
policy”, designed to encourage Bosnian leaders to 
take greater responsibility for their country: 
Every piece of legislation that I impose with my 
authority as the High Representative, gives 
politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina a perfect 
excuse not to do their job properly. The Bosnians 
have to take ownership of the progress of their 
country. My job is to ensure that the direction in 
which they go is that of a proper European 
country.
34 
But exercising ownership did not happen; on the 
contrary, the use of Bonn powers continued to 
increase until 2006. The High Representative, Lord 
Paddy Ashdown holds a record of removing 59 
Bosnian officials from office in one single day. 
Ashdown was also the first High Representative to 
hold the position of the European Union's Special 
Representative (EUSR). The EUSR was introduced in 
2002 in Bosnia, mandated to “assist the country to 
move beyond peace implementation towards EU 
integration.”
35 
Ashdown’s actions were the antithesis of the 
“ownership policy”. Because he, in addition to the 
position of High Representative, held the mandate of 
the EUSR, the extensive use of the Bonn powers 
                                                      
33   European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), “Opinion on the Constitutional 
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the 
High Representative”, Venice, 11 March 2005.  
34   Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, Speech by the High 
Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the Steering 
Board Ministerial Meeting, Sarajevo, 22 September 1999.  
35   European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (www.eusrbih.eu). The Bosnian Hiatus | 5 
pushed the EU into a role of an ‘EU member state 
builder’ in Bosnia. The PIC’s political support for 
such actions made the EU “mandated to negotiate 
with itself in determining every aspect of policy-
making in Bosnia.”
36 
Although Ashdown`s mandate as the PIC-guided 
High Representative was to protect the Dayton 
Agreement, he openly expressed his thoughts on how 
it was “a superb agreement to end a war, but a very 
bad agreement to make a state.”
37  This opinion seems 
to have been shared by most of the PIC members, and 
as a result the framework used by the PIC and the 
OHR increasingly became shaped by the EU 
strategies of engagement rather than by Dayton 
itself.
38 Too strong an attachment to the GFAP was 
even interpreted as a barrier to legislative progress 
towards EU integration.
39  
The OHR/EUSR double hat arrangement was only 
supposed to be an interim solution, as the OHR 
closure for the first time became seriously considered 
by some of the PIC members, but the transition from 
the OHR to the EUSR was never made. In spite of the 
mantra that the soft EU pull power should replace the 
strong OHR push power, the EUSR has been marginal 
ever since it was introduced in 2002. It is “a largely 
virtual body with little operational reality.”
40  
Until 2003, no plan existed that stated when the right 
moment was to close the OHR.
41 Then, after assessing 
what had been implemented out of the Dayton 
Agreement so far, the OHR realised that the 
Agreement, particularly its annexes 7
42 and 9,
43 were 
not going to be implemented in the near future, if ever. 
Thus, the OHR Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) 
document was created in order “to identify the core 
tasks on which the OHR now needs to concentrate in 
                                                      
36  David Chandler (2006), “State-Building in Bosnia” The 
Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship”, International Journal of 
Peace Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1. 
37 “Farewell, Sarajevo”, The Guardian, 2 November 2005. 
38 Ibid. 
39  European  Commission
  (2003c), “Report from the 
Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the European Union”, COM(2003) 692 final, 
Brussels, 18 November. 
40   “OHR: Results First, Exit Later”, Center for European 
Integration Strategies, 24 January 2007. 
41 Author’s interview with former OHR senior staff member, 
June 2010.  
42 Annex 7 of the GFAP grants refugees and displaced persons 
the right to return home safely and either regain lost property 
or obtain adequate compensation. 
43Annex 7 of the GFAP is supposed to establish BiH Public 
Corporations, such as Transportation Corporation, which 
organises and operates transportation facilities, such as roads, 
railways and ports. 
order to accomplish its mission”.
44  The MIP was 
updated in 2006, but regardless of its level of 
implementation, in June 2006 the PIC SB agreed that 
the OHR should immediately begin preparations to 
close on 30 June 2007, in order for it to be succeeded 
by the “reinforced EUSR”.
45  
The 2006 general election results in Bosnia spoiled 
the PIC’s plan. Nationalist rhetoric sharpened as the 
overall political situation in the country was perceived 
to worsen. So when the decision to close the OHR 
was revised in February 2007, the transition date was 
postponed to 30 June 2008. Finally, in its 2008 
meeting, the PIC decided to extend the HR`s mandate 
indefinitely until a set of benchmarks had been 
fulfilled – the so-called “5+2” package.
46 The origins 
of “5+2” can be found in the “Mission 
Implementation Plan” as shown in Table 1 below.  
If we examine the benchmarks of the 5+2 package, it 
becomes apparent that some have very little to do 
with the Dayton Agreement. In fact, some of the 
objectives – for example “the establishment of a 
National Fiscal Council” – were taken from different 
EU documents, such as the European Partnership with 
Bosnia, which has nothing to do with the OHR’s 
mandate.
47  Dayton gradually became subordinate to 
the requirements for eventual EU membership, and its 
unfulfilled parts have been left in the shadows of the 
5+2 agenda. Not surprisingly, the PIC`s 5+2 
conditionality was fully embraced by the EU – the EU 
shaped some of its requirements. This was a clear 
example of the “extreme flexibility in relation to the 
powers that international actors exercise over this 
nominally independent state.”
48 
 
                                                      
44  Office of the High Representative (2003), OHR Mission 
Implementation Plan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 
(http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/ohr-
mip/default.asp?content_id=29145). 
45  Office of the High Representative (2006), PIC Steering 
Board, Towards Ownership: From Peace Implementation to 
Euro-Atlantic Integration, Sarajevo: Communiqué. 
46   The five objectives are: Resolution of State Property, 
Resolution of Defence Property, Completion of the Brcko 
Final Award, Fiscal Sustainability of the State, Entrenchment 
of the Rule of Law. In addition to these objectives, there are 
also two conditions: signing of the SAA and a positive 
assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB.  
47 European Partnership is a document that works as a means 
to realise the European perspective of the Western Balkan 
countries. This document identifies priorities for action, 
adapted to the country’s specific needs and state of affairs. In 
addition, the Partnership also provides guidance for financial 
assistance to the country. 
48  David Chandler (2006), “State-Building in Bosnia” The 
Limits of ‘Informal Trusteeship”, International Journal of 
Peace Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1.  
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Table 1. 5 objectives +2 conditions to close the OHR, set by the PIC Steering Board 
  5+2  DAYTON  2003 MIP  Implementation 
status  Additional explanation 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
 
1
 
Resolution of 
State Property 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
Strengthening the capacity 
of BiH’s governing 
institutions, especially at 
the state-level 
NOT IMPLEMENTED 
The property concerned derives from the 
Succession Agreement signed between the 
successor states of former Yugoslavia. This 
agreement does not necessarily vest the state 
government with ownership rights. In the 
internal context of BIH, it is up to the 
different levels of jurisdiction to come to an 
agreement – on the basis of constitution and 
laws – on how this property is to be divided. 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
 
2
 
Resolution of 
Defence 
Property 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
Establishing state-level 
civilian command and 
control over armed forces, 
reform the security sector, 
and pave the way for 
integration into the Euro-
Atlantic framework  
NOT IMPLEMENTED  
In the course of the defence reform in 
Bosnia, 69 objects have been defined as 
needed for the Bosnian Defence Forces. This 
part of the State Property since then began 
being referred to as the Military Property. 
NATO is also insisting that the State of BiH 
assumes the ownership of these 69 objects. 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
 
3
 
Completion of 
the Brcko Final 
Award 
  Integration of Brčko  PARTIALLY 
IMPLEMENTED 
In 2009 the BiH parliament adopted the first 
ever amendment to the BiH constitution that 
redefined the legal status of Brčko District, 
which became a local governmental unit 
under the direct sovereignty of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and its territory is defined as a 
territory in the joint (condominium) 
ownership by the entities. The problem, 
however, remains that Brčko is not legally 
part of any electric networks in Bosnia, and it 
is not clear who gives them electricity - RS 
or FBiH. In September 2009 the HR imposed 
the law regulating this issue, but the RS 
refused to publish it the Official Gazette. 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
 
4
 
Fiscal 
Sustainability of 
the State 
  Reforming the Economy   
 
Agreement on a 
Permanent ITA 
Co-efficient 
methodology 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
Tax reform, including the 
introduction of BiH-wide, 
EU-compatible VAT 
IMPLEMENTED in 
June 2008 
 
Establishment of 
a National Fiscal 
Council 
NOT 
MENTIONED  NOT MENTIONED  IMPLEMENTED in 
May 2008 
 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
 
5
 
Entrenchment of 
the Rule of Law 
  Entrenching the rule of 
law 
 
 
Adoption of 
National War 
Crimes Strategy 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
Ensuring that extreme 
nationalists, war criminals, 
and their organised 
criminal networks cannot 
reverse peace 
implementation 
IMPLEMENTED in 
December 2008 
 
Passage of Law 
on Aliens and 
Asylum 
NOT 
MENTIONED  NOT MENTIONED  IMPLEMENTED in 
May 2008 
 
Adoption of 
National Justice 
Sector Reform 
Strategy 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
Restructuring of courts and 
prosecutors offices 
IMPLEMENTED in 
June 2008 
 
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
 
Signing of the 
SAA 
NOT 
MENTIONED 
To ensure that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a peaceful, 
viable state on course to 
European integration 
IMPLEMENTED in 
June 2008 
 
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
2
 
Positive 
assessment of the 
situation in BiH 
by the PIC SB  
NOT 
MENTIONED   NOT MENTIONED  NOT IMPLEMENTED 
After all other benchmarks are implemented, 
it will come down to a political decision by 
the PIC countries whether or not to close the 
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Source: Own compilation. 
 
Why the conditionality went wrong  
In general, conditionality can be seen as the main 
mechanism through which international organisations 
such as the EU induce non-member states to comply 
with their rules. In order for conditionality to work 
and be effective, the international organisation grants 
or withholds rewards in reaction to the fulfilment or 
non-fulfilment of certain conditions.
49  
If applying this model to BiH, one would need to 
assume that in order for the 5+2 conditionality to 
appeal to Bosnian political leaders, they would need 
to consider the closure of the OHR as a reward. But 
do Bosnian leaders wish to get rid of the OHR at all?  
It rather seems as though they have become used to 
someone else solving their problems for them: 
Although in favour of a certain law, often 
Bosnian politicians say that they cannot publicly 
express it as they would lose support of their 
respective ethnic group voters. Regularly such 
discussions end with them saying ‘if that law is so 
important for you, tell the High Representative to 
impose it’.
50 
The OHR relieved local politicians of the obligation 
to negotiate and compromise. By effectively fulfilling 
the BiH government’s responsibilities, the OHR 
created an atmosphere in which politicians were able 
to advocate inter-ethnically uncompromising political 
stances without fear of being blamed for negative 
actions by their electorates. Current stalemate over 
state and military property,
51 which at the moment is a 
crucial outstanding condition of the 5+2 package,
 can 
serve as an illustration of this. 
The issue of the state/military property appeared on 
the agenda of the OHR quite belatedly in 2004. Due 
                                                      
49 Aneta Borislavova Spendzharova (2003), “Bringing Europe 
In? The Impact of EU Conditionality on Bulgarian and 
Romanian Politics”, Southeast European Politics Vol. 4, No. 2 
(http://www.seep.ceu.hu/archives/issue42/spendzharova.pdf). 
50  EU Commission official, interviewed by the author, June 
2010. 
51  The Succession Agreement signed between the successor 
states of former Yugoslavia divided the property of former 
SFRJ among succession states. It defined the right of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in regards to part of the former SFRJ 
property. However, the agreement “does not necessarily vest 
the State government with the ownership rights. In the internal 
context of BIH, it is up to the different levels of jurisdiction to 
come to an agreement – on the basis of constitution and laws – 
on how this property is to be divided.” Later on, in the course 
of the defence reform in Bosnia, 69 objects have been defined 
as needed for the Bosnian Defence Forces. This part of the 
State Property has since been referred to as “Military 
Property”. 
to the entities beginning
52 to take control over assets, 
which was interpreted by the former High 
Representative as creating an imminent danger of 
misuse, the OHR imposed a decree in 2005 that 
declared the distribution and sale of the state/military 
property by any government level illegal and 
forbidden, until a state-level law defining how it 
should be distributed was in place.
53  
Very little has been achieved regarding the law, 
demonstrated by the fact that five years later, this 
prohibition is still in force. It remains the main barrier 
to the OHR closure, and it is the clash of two opposite 
political views on how this property should be dealt 
with that is at the root of the problem.
54 The OHR, not 
                                                      
52 It should be clarified that a large amount of state property is 
actually well regulated and does not fall within the category 
under prohibition. Until the issue of “state property” came 
onto the agenda, the entities were effectivly using the assets of 
prewar Bosnia and Herzegovina as their own property for 
years. As if perpetuating the former Republic Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on their own territories, they assigned the 
property of the forests to public cantonal forestry companies in 
the Federation under the guidance of cantonal ministries. In 
the RS the same happened on the entity level. The water 
resources of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also divided 
between the two entities, while the Federation again divided 
them into two riverbasin-oriented agencies. The same division 
has taken place in the energy sector. The Bosnian energy 
sector is divided among the Elektroprivreda BiH and 
Elektroprivreda RS. Roads were divided between the RS and 
the Federation, and they are again divided among the federal, 
the cantonal and the municipal level. The railways are also 
divided into two companies. 
53  The OHR issued three decisions simultaneously, enacting 
Laws “on the Temporary Prohibition of Disposal of State 
Property” in the Republika Srpska, the Federation of BiH and 
of Bosnia. 
54 Bosniak SBiH party leader Haris Silajdzic, stated that all the 
immovable property should be owned by the state level 
government, while the entities and other lower levels should 
receive the right of usage on the property they need. The Serb 
SNSD party leader Milorad Dodik
 says it is the entities that 
should receive the ownership, and then they could give the 
right of usage to the state for the property the state institutions 
need. He claims that the Dayton Agreement vested the entities 
with the right of ownership over state property. In all of its 
provisions and annexes, the Dayton Agreement does not have 
a single article that regulates state property. However, that fact 
that the Dayton Agreement did not foresee any regulation on 
state property does not mean that the property titles of the 
former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
automatically abolished and transferred to the entities. Annex 
4, the Constitution, postulated that Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
the legal successor of Republic (GFAP, Annex IV (The 
Constitution), Article I.), thus creating a basis for Silajdzic’s 
argument on how all property owned by the former Republic 
of BiH should now be owned by the State of BiH. Silajdzic’s 
party lost the 2010 general elections, and it is to be seen 
whether the SDP and the SDA who got the majority of  
8 | Goran Tirak 
having the political support to impose the solution for 
the state/military property issue, is calling for a 
compromise solution,
55  but the attitudes of Bosnian 
political leaders remained irreconcilable. Moreover, in 
September 2010, in the midst of the pre-election 
campaign, the Republika Srpska Assembly adopted a 
law regulating the status of the property under OHR`s 
prohibition on the territory of that entity. Such law is 
in direct violation of the OHR-imposed ban on the 
state property. It is difficult to understand why the RS 
government, which is one of the “strongest advocates 
for the OHR closure”
56  just keeps heating up the 
political debate, making it impossible for the PIC to 
take a decision on OHR closure. 
The OHR took no action regarding the adoption of the 
litigious law.
57  In the past, such a law would have 
been annulled by the High Representatives before the 
delegates even left the Assembly building, but now, 
without the PIC consensus, such a decision is 
impossible. There was just a brief announcement by 
the PIC SB saying that the adoption of this law by the 
Republika Srpska National Assembly: 
is a unilateral act that undermines the long-term 
effort to allocate state property in a way that 
ensures the functionality of all levels of authority 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina... 
Russia, however, refused to join the statement.  
This course of action (or rather non-action) proves 
that the OHR is just a “dead horse”, as Miroslav 
Lajcak described it when he resigned from the 
position of High Representative in order to become 
Slovakia’s foreign minister in January 2009.
58 Lajcak 
said:  
                                                                                          
Bosniak votes in 2010 general elections will take a softer 
stance on the state property issue. 
55 The compromise should be based on “self assessment”: The 
State of BiH to define what objects it currently needs, and will 
need in the course of EU accession, while the other property 
will be distributed to other levels of government. So far, the 
Bosnian authorities have failed to produce this self assessment, 
and the OHR names former BiH Prime Minister Nikola Spiric, 
who is a member of Dodik’s SNSD, as the main culprit.   
56  Antonio Prlenda, “Gregorian: Bad Rhetoric is Preventing 
OHR Closure”, SETimes,  20 July 2009 
(http://www.setimes.com). 
57 OHR will simply wait for someone in the FBiH to take the 
RS law to the Bosnian Constitutional Court, hoping that the 
court ruling will set a precedent to help draft a law that will 
define the status of all the state property, enabling the OHR to 
lift the imposed prohibition of disposal. 
58 What worried the international community in 2007, when 
Miroslav Lajčák took the position of the High Representative, 
was the inability of Bosnia's leaders to agree on the country's 
future and their propensity to articulate their disagreements in 
inflammatory terms. Lajčák was not able to do much about 
either problem, although he named the main culprit, RS Prime 
Minister Milorad Dodik, but also mentioned the Bosniak 
If there is no decision to close down the OHR, 
then efforts should be made to strengthen the role 
and authority of the High Representative – and 
that would absolutely mean that European issues 
become secondary... Europe's philosophy is a 
philosophy of partnership, while strengthening the 
OHR is a continuation of the protectorate.
59 
Nevertheless, the protectorate continues to exist, but 
the OHR capacities are not strengthened. Since 2007, 
the use of the Bonn powers declined dramatically, due 
to a lack of political support for such actions by 
leading PIC countries, mainly Russia, but also by the 
majority of the EU countries of the PIC.  
Part of the problem? 
For most EU member states, the goal of closing the 
OHR has become an idée fixe. Europe’s plan was to 
prolong reinforcing the Sarajevo EUSR Office until 
the OHR closes.
60  As it became apparent that the 
implementation of the 5+2 was not progressing, most 
of the EU started seeing the OHR as part of the 
overall problem, rather than part of the solution. As 
the Italian representative within the EU Council 
explains, “the Conditions are important, but we must 
not let ourselves us become hostages of the 5+2”.  
And Italy is not the only EU member state to hold 
such a position. The majority of the EU member states 
feel hostage to the PIC 5+2 conditionality, which isn’t 
producing results. In order to break the stalemate, 
some EU countries, particularly Italy
61 and France,
62 
pushed the idea of ‘watering down’ the 5+2 
conditionality. On the other hand, the UK
63 and to a 
lesser extent the Netherlands
64 and Denmark,
65did not 
want to agree on it. For the latter, the issue was a 
matter of credibility – not to loosen the conditionality, 
as that would send the wrong message of the EU 
                                                                                          
leader Haris Silajdžić who took part of the blame. Dodik 
openly defied the OHR, saying he would be ready to “wrestle 
with NATO tanks” if the OHR used its powers against him. 
With no tanks in sight, the OHR refrained from using its 
powers although it accused Dodik and others of violating the 
Dayton Agreement.  
59  Tihomir Loza, “The Disenchanted Potentate”, European 
Voice, 3 February 2009 (www.europeanvoice.com). 
60 EU Council official, interviewed by the author, June 2009. 
61  Author’s interview with an Italian diplomat in the EU 
Council, June 2010. 
62   Author’s interview with a French diplomat in the EU 
Council, June 2010. 
63 Author’s interview with an UK diplomat in the EU Council, 
July 2010, and with a Foreign and Commonwealth official in 
London. 
64   Author’s interview with a Dutch diplomat in the EU 
Council, May 2010. 
65   Author’s interview with a Danish diplomat in the EU 
Council, May 2010. The Bosnian Hiatus | 9 
backing off when faced with enduring resistance to 
fulfilling its conditions. Since this position was shared 
by the US and Turkey, the conclusion was obvious: 
the 5+2 conditions must be fulfilled – full stop. 
In addition, US officials are sceptical that the EUSR 
can do much in Bosnia with its “punitive recourses” 
compared to those of the OHR. Without executive 
powers, “the EU pull power is not strong enough to 
make the three ethnic groups in BiH cooperate.”
66 The 
EU has done little to convince them otherwise. 
The Butmir Process in late 2009 was another attempt 
to help Bosnia move forward.
67   Clearly it was 
impossible to gain consensus of the EU27, let alone 
the consensus of the PIC on the OHR closure, without 
seeing Bosnia deliver on the 5+2. So the last 
commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, and the 
Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt came up with the 
idea of linking Bosnia’s EU accession with the 
phasing-out of the OHR.
68 They hoped that it would 
present additional leverage for Bosnian politicians to 
broker a deal on the 5+2. This idea gained the 
approval of the member states, as seen in the 2009 
December Council conclusions:  
The Council will not be in a position to consider 
an application for membership by Bosnia and 
Herzegovina until the transition of the OHR to a 
reinforced EU presence has been decided 
69 
The exact meaning of having a “reinforced EU 
presence” in Bosnia has never been fully clarified. 
While preparing for the transition meant to happen on 
30 June 2007, the idea for the revised EUSR mandate 
was to 
continue to concentrate on political and security-
related issues, ... as well as residual 
responsibilities of the Dayton Peace Agreement”, 
and to “offer political advice and facilitate 
political and legal processes, in particular with 
respect to constitutional reform.
70 
Neither was it ever determined how the EUSR should 
accomplish these goals. During the Czech presidency 
                                                      
66 US official, interviewed by the author, May 2010. 
67  In November 2009 at Butmir (EUFOR military base in 
Butmir on the outskirts of Sarajevo) senior American and 
European officials presented a package of proposed 
constitutional changes to Bosnian political party leaders. The 
initiators of this political dialogue were Swedish Foreign 
Minister Carl Bildt and US Deputy Secretary of State, James 
Steinberg. The Butmir talks ended without agreement. 
68 EU Council official, interviewed by the author, June 2009. 
69 Council of Europe, General Affairs Council, Conclusions on 
Enlargement/Stabilisation and Association Process, Brussels: 
Progress Report, 7-8 December 2009. 
70  EU Council Internal Document, “Report on a Reinforced 
EU-Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Context of 
the Closure of the Office of the High Representative”. 
of the EU, member states discussed the Bosnian 
“EUSR toolbox”, but no consensus was ever reached. 
Most of the European countries seemed reluctant to 
have a EUSR with any form of executive powers, as 
this would be in contrast to European values. Others 
wanted to have a ‘back-up option’ in case things went 
wrong after the OHR closed, being in favour of some 
form of “residual Bonn powers”.
71 And then, as BiH 
entered the election year, all debates halted, as no 
solution to the remaining 5+2 was in sight. 
Meanwhile, the Lisbon Treaty came into force, and 
the roles of EUSRs all over the world are being 
reshaped. Regarding Bosnia, a ‘personal 
union/double-hatting arrangement’ of the EUSR and 
the Head of the Commission Delegation, is being 
considered,
72   but a precondition for such a 
development is the closure of the OHR. The Bosnian 
EUSR mandate has been extended until August 2011; 
it is not clear what will happen after that.  
Frustrated with waiting for the double-hatted 
OHR/EUSR arrangement to end, the European 
Commission together with some member states, 
particularly France and Italy, started looking into a 
possible way out – to decouple the two roles. Two 
camps have resurfaced on this matter. Those in favour 
justify the idea, saying it would create clarity by 
defining EU envoys’ competences clearly in regards 
to those of the HR.
73 The ones opposing, namely the 
UK, the Netherlands and Germany, express their 
concerns on the impact of the decoupling on the 
future OHR, but also on the overall situation in 
Bosnia. Until now, not a single official discussion in 
the European Council has taken place on this matter.  
Although the EU makes up more than half of the PIC 
Steering Board, there is no common EU voice in the 
PIC. Mostly due to the UK`s position (shared by some 
smaller MS such as Denmark and partly the 
Netherlands), there is no common stand of the EU27 
that the time of OHR in Bosnia has expired, or that its 
further existence presents an impediment to Bosnia’s 
development as a sovereign democratic country 
striving to become an EU member state. Only when 
there is no more OHR as a supreme ruler of Bosnia, 
                                                      
71 Such powers should be used only in extremely urgent cases, 
such as potential moves towards secession by Republika 
Srpska (RS). Of course, the question would be whether the RS 
would care at all and whether the HR would have the support 
of the EU member states to enforce the decision, even if it 
meant for them to impose sanctions if Republika Srpska does 
not give in. 
72   European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
“Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010” 
Brussels, 14 October 2009 (http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/ 
docs/StrategyPaper20092.pdf). 
73 EU MS diplomat, interviewed by the author, June 2009.  
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will the local politicians get an opportunity to show 
that they are really capable of governing themselves.  
Remodelling conditions as the way 
forward  
The decision to link the OHR closure with Bosnia`s 
membership application has backfired.
74 The  OHR 
has become an obstacle to Bosnia`s slow but steady 
path to EU accession, because OHR practice, as the 
Venice Commission stated, “does not correspond to 
democratic principles.”
 75  However, the EU doesn’t 
seem to be capable of providing guidance to Bosnia 
“by more subtle means” because it is left in the 
shadow of the OHR.  
At the same time, the OHR is left with very little 
credibility, and is unable to take up any action that 
will contribute to finding solutions, as the recent 
developments with the state property issue suggest. In 
addition, OHR’s transition to the EUSR has become 
one of the major frustrations for most member states. 
Although tempting, the idea of decoupling the roles of 
the EUSR and the OHR should be abandoned. Even if 
the OHR is to be downsized
76  and displaced from 
Sarajevo, knowledge that there is a ‘protector’ with 
his super powers will remain a perfect excuse for BiH 
leaders not to take any responsibility. 
A series of missed opportunities, half-baked plans and 
lack of exit strategies are starting to have negative 
consequences on BiH. All of these attempts lead one 
logic and one logic only: 2011 must be a year of 
                                                      
74 The 2010 Commission’s progress report does not directly 
mention the link between the OHR closure and Bosnia`s 
membership application; it just merely asserts that “making 
progress towards meeting the conditions which have been set 
for the closure of the OHR by the PIC Steering Board remains 
essential”. Using such watered-down language suggests that 
the Commission has started to consider accepting BiH`s 
application while the OHR is still in place. However, since the 
membership application is not a `letterbox exercise` anymore 
and requires a political consensus among the EU27, it remains 
unclear what the members states positions on such a 
development will be.  
75   European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission), “Opinion on the Constitutional 
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the 
High Representative”, Venice, 11 March 2005.  
76 A decision will be made to proceed with the decoupling. the 
idea of OHR being be downsized and maybe even displaced 
from BiH was discussed, so the  EU delegation can then be 
merged with the EUSR, and resume its mandate in accordance 
with the new EU foreign affairs policies. However, such a 
development would imply that Bosnia`s EU path is obstructed 
as it cannot even submit the membership application while 
there is still the OHR, unless the  EU Council changes the 
December 2009 conclusions and allows Bosnia, regardless of 
the OHR, to apply for membership and keep pace with its 
neighbours.  
decision: the OHR needs to be succeeded by the 
reinforced EU delegation that will be merged with the 
EUSR into a single body.  
This should not imply that the 5+2 conditionality 
should be abandoned, by any means. The condition of 
finding a solution for the state property issue has the 
potential for a remodelling, so it does not interfere 
with Bosnia`s accession process. The condition of the 
military property has already been taken over by 
NATO, in order for Bosnia to continue moving 
towards membership in the Alliance. In a similar 
matter, the issue of state property can also be easily 
remodelled so it becomes a condition for Bosnia in 
the course of the accession process. 
Lifting the emphasis from the state/military property 
issues will put the spotlight on the real EU conditions 
for Bosnia, such as implementing the ECHR ruling, 
adopting the State Census Law, proceeding with the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
implementation, etc.  
The decision to close the OHR is not to be made by 
the EU – this must be decided by the PIC Steering 
Board (SB) – unanimously. Even if the state/military 
property issue is resolved, the 5+2 benchmarks 
require a “positive assessment of the situation in BiH 
by the PIC SB.” This will be a political decision of the 
PIC countries.  
The consensus of EU27 is a precondition for the EU 
to start seriously using available mechanisms to create 
a joint vision within all the PIC members – 
particularly the US and Turkey – that the OHR is a 
broken instrument beyond hope of repair and must be 
closed as soon as possible. Only when such a common 
position is reached can the EU can start reassuring its 
international partners that it is capable of sorting out 
problems in its own backyard, especially after having 
invested years and billions of euro in doing so.  
Re-shaping the conditions, such as that of state 
property, in a way that makes the EU responsible for 
their implementation will show that the EU is flexible 
enough to recognise when a certain strategy isn’t 
working.  However, the EU will have to find a carrot 
that is tempting enough to help reach consensus in 
Bosnia on such issues.   
The EU anticipated the results of the October 2010 
general elections in Bosnia hoping they would change 
the political landscape of the country in such a way 
that the pending conditions would be fulfilled. The 
elections did bring certain changes, but only among 
the Bosniak voters.
77  The shift away from Silajdzic 
                                                      
77 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) received the majority of 
their votes. Also, the election of Bakir Iztetbegovic (Party of 
Democratic Action – SDA) to the post of Bosniak 
representative in the tripartite country’s presidency came as The Bosnian Hiatus | 11 
and his maximalist stance can be seen as positive. 
However, in Republika Srpska and parts of the 
Federation with a Croatian majority, the voters 
generally elected the same parties that were in power 
under the 2006-2010 mandate.
78 It is yet to be seen 
whether their nationalistic rhetoric was just part of a 
pre-election campaign. The best case scenario, of 
course, would be the ability of the new government to 
deliver on the remaining 5+2. However, if political 
deadlock in Bosnia continues, remodelling the 
conditionality would enable Bosnia to move forward. 
While waiting for the new Bosnian government to be 
consolidated, which is not expected before February 
2011, The EU Council, together with Catherine 
Ashton, the new High Representative of the Union for 
CFSP,
79  should re-open the debate on the ‘EUSR 
toolbox’, focusing on defining the “reinforced EU 
presence” that will succeed the OHR. This time it 
needs to be clarified that “reinforced EU presence” 
will not be an OHR under a different name. Instead, 
the soft politics of conditionality – proven to work by 
the successful visa liberalisation roadmap 
implementation in BiH should be the cornerstone of 
any future EU engagement in this country.  
The decision to close down the OHR will enable 
Bosnia to submit its membership application and start 
the screening process.  Such development is “far more 
likely turn Bosnia’s unwieldy constitutional structures 
into a working federal system than any attempt to 
renegotiate the constitution in isolation from the EU 
accession process.”
80 More importantly, OHR closure 
will coerce BiH politicians to assume ownership.  
Only then, for the first time since the Dayton, will the 
future of the country truly be in the hands of its 
                                                                                          
the greatest surprise. In the past couple of years, the SDA has 
been trying to reposition itself as a more moderate party, 
wanting to base its politics on compromise.  
78 Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) took the lead in Cantons 
with the Croatian majority. This party is particularly unhappy. 
Under current electoral law in Bosnia, the presidency members 
are elected in a way that the Serb member is elected from 
Republika Srpska, while the Bosniak and Croat members are 
elected from the Federation. Because of this, there is no 
guarantee that Bosniaks will not vote for the Croat candidate 
and vice versa. As in 2006, they declared that SDP Zeljko 
Komsic had no legitimacy to represent the interests of Bosnian 
Croats, as most of his votes came from Bosniaks. 
79 The post was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam as the 
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy; until it was expanded by the Lisbon Treaty to sit in the 
European Commission and chair the council of EU foreign 
ministers. The post will be backed up by the European 
External Action Service, a diplomatic corps, once it is fully 
operational. 
80 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and Daniel Korski, “Beyond 
wait-and-see: The way forward for EU Balkan policy”, ECFR, 
May 2010. 
democratically elected political leaders. Maybe then 
the government can keep up the EU accession pace 
with the other Western Balkan countries.  
Afterword: The myth about OHR 
preserving the peace in Bosnia 
A commonly expressed concern is that the security 
situation in Bosnia will deteriorate when there is no 
more OHR. This fear has little to do with reality, as it 
is not the OHR that preserves peace in BiH. After the 
1995 GFAP, there was a NATO-mandated 
peacekeeping force of over 60,000 soldiers in Bosnia. 
But as the security situation improved, peacekeeping 
duties were given to the EU in December 2004.
81 
Even in the event of a security threat, the Bonn 
powers are not the tool to prohibit violence, as the 
High Representative cannot order EUFOR to act.
82 
EUFOR engagement needs to be decided by the EU 
Council’s Political and Security Committee. The 
Council`s readiness to maintain an executive military 
role beyond 2010,
83 while almost no one in Europe 
believes there is a threat of conflict in BiH, sends a 
“strong political message”
84   to BiH – mainly to 
Bosniaks – that any attempt atf Republika Srpska 
secession is out of the question. This safeguard should 
remain once the OHR is gone. 
                                                      
81 An EU peacekeeping force, called EUFOR, is charged with 
keeping the peace in Bosnia and overseeing the Bosnian armed 
forces. Currently there are roughly 2,000 troops on the ground, 
reinforced by over-the-horizon reserves of up to four battalions 
from Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
82 “The High Representative shall have no authority over the 
IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of 
military operations or the IFOR chain of command.” – GFAP, 
Annex X, Article II, 9. 
83 Council of the European Union, EU Military Operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA.), 
Brussels: Factsheet, January 2010.  
84 EU Commission official, July 2010. 